This chapter assesses the doctrine of reasonable interchangeability through the lens of the US Department of Justice's (DOJ's) successful effort to enjoin the megamerger of two of the largest national insurance companies, Aetna and Humana. The DOJ focused its challenge on the companies' Medicare Advantage business, arguing that it is a separate product market from original Medicare and the merger would substantially reduce competition in the market for Medicare Advantage in many geographic markets across the country. The case turned on whether there was reasonable interchangeability between original Medicare and Medicare Advantage in the eyes of consumers. The judge relied on both practical indicia of interchangeability, including evidence of how likely Medicare beneficiaries were to switch between Medicare Advantage and Original Medicare, along with econometric evidence. The decision provides a useful roadmap of how a knowledgeable judge reviewing a merger will consider
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2015, after a frenzy of merger talks in the health insurance industry, two proposed mergers emerged combining four of the five largest health insurers in the country: Anthem agreed to acquire Cigna, and Aetna moved to acquire Humana. A year later, in July 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed complaints in the district court for the District of Columbia to enjoin both mergers. While the two cases were litigated at almost the same time, and involved the same industry, the similarities mostly stopped there. As a practical matter, if DOJ was to win its challenges to these megamergers, each of which spanned hundreds of geographic markets and many potential product markets, the agency had to develop a simple, straightforward narrative, similar to the one enforcers can more easily adopt when seeking to enjoin smaller transactions.
In its challenge to the Aetna-Humana merger, the DOJ focused on the companies' Medicare Advantage business. The government argued that Medicare Advantage, which provides broader coverage than the original Medicare program, is a separate product market from "Original Medicare" and the merger would substantially reduce competition in the market for Medicare Advantage in many geographic markets across the country. The parties and their experts did not dispute that "Original Medicare" (often supplemented with a "Medicare Supplement" plan to fill in gaps in Original Medicare's coverage) is functionally interchangeable with Medicare Advantage plans. The case turned on whether there was reasonable interchangeability between the two in the eyes of consumers. After a lengthy trial, Judge John Bates ultimately decided that consideration of Brown Shoe factors and econometric analysis supported finding a separate market for Medicare Advantage products.
This chapter focuses on the product market question at the heart of the Aetna-Humana case, including the parties' respective positions and the court's ruling. Judge Bates issued a 155-page opinion that found the merger anticompetitive based on a careful, detailed traditional analysis. His approach highlights the evidence that matters to a court when considering the scope of the relevant product market. Judge Bates considered the factors set forth in Brown Shoe À are the products in the candidate market functionally interchangeable À but moved on to the key question of whether they were reasonably interchangeable in the eyes of consumers. To assess this, he relied on testimony, the parties' own documents, evidence of how likely Medicare beneficiaries were to switch between Medicare Advantage and Original Medicare, and econometric evidence. The AetnaHumana case adds color À and some clarity À to what parties can expect from a knowledgeable judge reviewing a merger in the future.
BACKGROUND The Legal Framework for Horizontal Merger Challenges
To block a transaction under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the government (like any plaintiff) must establish the transaction may "substantially lessen competition" or "tend to create a monopoly" in a line of commerce.
1 If the government can show the merger would cause a significant increase in concentration and give the merged firm an undue share of a relevant market, following the Philadelphia National Bank 2 decision, the court presumes the merger will lessen competition. The burden of producing evidence to rebut this presumption shifts to the defendants. 3 To rebut the presumption the merging parties can show, among other things, that entry into the market on a sufficient scale to overcome the anticompetitive harm is likely, 4 that one of the firms is failing (and there is no less anticompetitive alternative than the merger at hand), 5 or that efficiencies outweigh the possible anticompetitive harm. 6 If a defendant successfully rebuts the presumption, the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts back to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.
7
Reasonable Interchangeability: "Practical Indicia," Price Cross-elasticity of Demand, and More
When courts and enforcers assess a merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, they address three key issues: (1) the product market or markets; (2) the geographic market or markets; and (3) the merger's effect on competition in the identified product and geographic markets. This chapter focuses on the first of those issues: the definition of a product market for purposes of assessing whether a transaction violates the antitrust laws. While other issues were in play, 8 the proper product market was a $37 billion question, and it was the court's decision to identify a narrower market than urged by the merging parties ultimately torpedoed the deal.
The Supreme Court wrote in Brown Shoe that " [t] he outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it." 9 The Court held that within a broad product market there can be "submarkets" that are themselves cognizable markets for purposes of the antitrust laws. These submarkets can be identified, the Court wrote, by assessing "practical indicia" such as industry recognition or public treatment of a submarket as separate, the products' peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.
10 While the Court referred to this framework as a way of defining "submarkets," properly understood, the analysis should serve as a way of assessing any market, regardless of whether it is contained in part or in whole within a larger market.
11
Submarkets have been found relying heavily on one or more of these practical indicia, including (1) industry or public recognition of the submarket; 12 (2) peculiar characteristics and uses; 13 (3) unique production facilities; 14 (4) distinct customers; 15 (5) specialized vendors; 16 (6) distinct prices; 17 and (7) sensitivity to price changes.
18
Brown Shoe's "practical indicia" factor-analysis is the type of approach that courts and attorneys regularly navigate in many areas of law. It allows parties and courts leeway to make policy judgments and balance factors based on the particular circumstances of a case.
19
When the Supreme Court created the practical indicia test in Brown Shoe, it also recognized that economic analysis can be used to assess the outer bounds of a product market. 20 The price cross-elasticity of demand between a product and possible substitutes is generally accepted as a tool by which reasonable interchangeability can be measured.
Although While Medicare Advantage has unique characteristics, it has been argued that it "really is a form of Medicare, governed by many of the same statutory and regulatory provisions as the traditional Medicare fee-for-service option created by Parts A and B of the Act."
30
As of June 2016, 69 percent of Medicare enrollees received healthcare coverage through Original Medicare, while 31 percent were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans.
31
The History of the Aetna-Humana Merger Aetna and Humana are two of the Big 5 National Insurers. 32 Within that small group of health insurance titans, Aetna and Humana are two of the biggest players in Medicare Advantage. Humana is the largest and fastest growing individual Medicare Advantage insurer, with over 2.5 million enrollees. 33 Aetna has historically been more of a commercial health insurance giant, but after its 2013 acquisition of Coventry Health Care À a major Medicare Advantage player À it became a significant Medicare Advantage player itself, fourth largest in the nation.
34 Together Aetna and Humana serve 25 percent of all Medicare Advantage enrollees.
On July 2, 2015, Aetna and Humana signed an Agreement and Plan of Merger under which Aetna would acquire Humana for $37 billion. 35 The companies touted the merger as a "complementary combination" that would:
bring[] together Humana's growing Medicare Advantage business with Aetna's diversified portfolio and commercial capabilities to create a company serving the most seniors in the Medicare Advantage program and the second-largest managed care company in the United States.
36
According to the companies' press release, " [t] he combined entity will help drive better value and higher-quality healthcare by reducing administrative costs, [and] leveraging best-in-breed practices from the two companies." 37 A year later, in July 2016, the DOJ filed suits to block both the AetnaHumana merger and the other mammoth that had been marching along in parallel, Anthem's proposed acquisition of Cigna. 38 The Attorney General at the time, Loretta Lynch, painted the DOJ's two-pronged enforcement effort in broad brushstrokes, stating that "[i]f these mergers were to take place, the competition among insurers that has pushed them to provide lower premiums, higher-quality care and better benefits would be eliminated."
39 To the public, the two deals may have been horses of the same color. But even a cursory review of the complaints made it clear the DOJ had tailored its approach to the two cases very differently, with an eye to the unique weak points in each transaction. In the Anthem-Cigna case, the DOJ challenged the transaction based on anticompetitive effects in the markets for large group insurance, also known as the national account market. In Aetna-Humana, the DOJ chose to focus its case on the market for Medicare Advantage plans.
The DOJ identified 364 counties around the country where, the agency alleged, concentration in the Medicare Advantage market would rise above the presumptively unlawful level if Aetna and Humana merged and there were no divestitures. 40 The DOJ argued that post-merger, the company would have a monopoly in 70 of the counties and serve over 80 percent of Medicare Advantage consumers in 80 counties.
41
Shortly after the DOJ filed its complaint, Aetna and Humana presented a proposed divestiture, recognizing that in some markets the post-merger concentration levels would be very high. The parties identified Molina, a managed Medicaid specialist, as the divestiture candidate. 42 The companies proposed to sell lives to Molina in all 364 counties at issue.
43
MARKET DEFINITION: THE HEART OF THE AETNA-HUMANA CASE Medicare from its analysis of the merger's effects in the identified geographic markets. 46 The defendants did not concede that the transaction was doomed if the court accepted Medicare Advantage as the relevant product market, raising numerous additional defenses. Still, the parties' arguments in briefing and their presentations at trial made it clear that the main battleground was over the definition of the relevant product market.
The Practical Indicia Approach to the Product Market
The complaint framed the Medicare-Advantage-only product market in a way that has intuitive appeal: Medicare Advantage plans have distinct features and characteristics that differentiate them from Original Medicare, such as broader coverage, lower cost, and narrower provider network. 47 Although the distinctions are not as stark as between entirely dissimilar products (e.g., short-term travel health insurance vs traditional annual commercial health insurance), there are many ways in which Medicare Advantage plans stand apart from Original Medicare, including additional coverage (e.g., dental, vision, etc.), more limited choice of providers, lower copays, and lower out-of-pocket maximums.
The defendants developed a substantial body of evidence on both sides that fed their arguments that Medicare Advantage and Original Medicare are reasonably interchangeable. Aetna and Cigna argued that Medicare and Medicare Advantage are offered to the same set of customers À people over the age of 65 À and the companies compete for these customers both at enrollment (when they "age in" to Medicare) and after enrollment (when enrollees may periodically switch plans). Approximately 10,000 people age into Medicare every day. 48 As a result, the companies argued, there is constant pressure on Medicare Advantage to compete against Original Medicare for a bigger share of the new entrants at the same time they compete for enrollees considering a switch.
The defendants also highlighted significant differentiation among Medicare Advantage plans. They argued that the diverse options available within Medicare Advantage products make the differences between Medicare Advantage and Original Medicare less significant. Medicare enrollees regularly reevaluate their healthcare needs À healthcare needs change significantly for people over the age of 65 as they age. 59 They tried to make the case that every enrollee is different and healthcare is too personal to reduce to demographics: "no two seniors are exactly alike." 60 The court was unpersuaded, stating that although "seniors make individualized healthcare decisions," this "does not mean … all generalization is futile."
61
The court assessed the parties' practical indicia evidence in a traditional way. It accepted that Medicare Advantage and Original Medicare are functionally interchangeable (they by and large do the same thing) but recognized this didn't answer the question whether the products were reasonably interchangeable in the eyes of consumers. Medicare Advantage is less expensive than the cost Original Medicare together with a Medicare Supplement (which is needed to achieve functional interchangeability), both upfront and over time. Original Medicare allows broad consumer choice of providers; Medicare Advantage plans offer much narrower provider networks. Original Medicare has significant gaps in coverage and more limited services; Medicare Advantage fills many of those gaps (e.g., with prescription drug coverage) and offers extras such as gym memberships, vision, dental, and hearing coverage.
The court recognized that Medicare Supplement plans can fill the gaps in Original Medicare. But the court was persuaded by evidence from the parties that Medicare Advantage and Original Medicare/MedSupp plans are not treated as reasonably interchangeable in the defendants' own businesses. The evidence indicated that the parties thought of and treated the two quite differently from a competitive standpoint. In some internal documents, both Aetna The court found that this switching data demonstrated: [T] here are some seniors with durable preferences for Medicare Advantage. These seniors would be less likely than average to switch to an (often more costly) Original Medicare option in the event of a small but significant non-transitory increase in Medicare Advantage prices, and perhaps much less likely if they are low-income. 70 The defendants were unable to provide a convincing explanation why the switching data weren't important. They argued the data did not capture consumer choice for the large number of new consumers aging into Medicare. The court acknowledged the point, but was unconvinced that this ongoing initial access to the market should undermine switching data as a proxy for consumer preferences. The court found that regardless of how newly eligible enrollees behave, the consumer preferences demonstrated by the switching data would allow a Medicare Advantage monopolist to increase price without losing customers to Original Medicare.
71
The court did not give any indication of what evidence related to the consumers aging into Medicare could have undermined the switching data. The court also did not engage with the argument that Medicare Advantage needs to continue to innovate and compete for consumers as their needs change over time (e.g., decreasing retirement funds, increasing healthcare costs). The court seemed sufficiently convinced that the market should be limited to Medicare Advantage by the switching data and the parties' own documents showing that they treated Medicare Advantage differently.
The Econometric Analysis
The parties and the court evaluated the product market both using a traditional practical indicia and econometric analyses. The parties' experts assessed the market using diversion ratios and the Merger Guidelines' hypothetical monopolist test. That test asks if: a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future seller of those products ("hypothetical monopolist") likely would impose at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price ("SSNIP") on at least one product in the market, including at least one product sold by one of the merging firms. 72 The government's economist, Dr. Aviv Nevo, found that Medicare Advantage "passed under all formulations of [the] hypothetical monopolist test."
73 Nevo considered industry evidence, switching data (which he found tied switching decisions largely to price), other empirical studies of how seniors choose their coverage, and his own "nested logit model." The nested logit model assesses whether seniors prefer a Medicare Advantage plan "because it is a Medicare Advantage plan."
74 The nested logit model found that 70 percent of the enrollees leaving Medicare Advantage plans as a result of a price increase would choose another Medicare Advantage plan. 75 Nevo considered this result conservative given that available data indicated a diversion ratio closer to 80 percent. 76 Using the results from his nested logit model, Nevo then ran two versions of the hypothetical monopolist test, both of which indicated that Medicare Advantage alone is a proper product market because a hypothetical monopolist could impose a small but significant non-transitory increase in price ("SSNIP").
The defendants' economist, Jonathan Orszag, countered that diversion ratios are more important than switching data because switching data fails to capture the critical "age-in" population that is entering the market for the first time at age 65. 77 Orszag found a diversion ratio of 50 percent from Medicare Advantage to Original Medicare in response to a price increase or quality drop. Orszag also argued that Nevo's switching-data analysis failed to recognize a significant portion of individuals would switch from Medicare Advantage plans to Original Medicare (plus a supplement) before they would choose some Medicare Advantage plans. In other words, while the switching data showed enrollees moving between similar Medicare advantage plans, some of those enrollees would switch to Original Medicare (plus MedSupp) in preference to other, less similar, Medicare Advantage plans. 78 Orszag argued that including all Medicare Advantage plans in the market, while excluding all Original Medicare plus MedSupp combinations, was erroneous. 79 To support his argument Orszag relied on an example (Example 6) in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in which the agencies state that if two products (A and B) satisfy the hypothetical monopolist test, a third product, C, should "normally" be included in the relevant market as well if, when the price of A is raised, more sales are diverted to C than to B. The court faulted the analysis, however, because Orszag failed to identify particular Original Medicare and MedSupp combinations existing in the market that were preferred to particular Medicare Advantage products. The court also clearly was troubled by the notion that a theoretical econometric analysis should be allowed to override the market definition the judge felt was impelled by the market facts:
If taken to its logical conclusion, defendants' position implies a purely econometric approach to market definition, requiring the government to calculate individual diversion ratios for all the products potentially in the market, rank them from highest to lowest, and, at some point, draw a line between those products that fall within the market and those products that fall outside. But that technical approach is not taken by the cases. Econometric evidence can be powerful evidence, but it is not the only evidence that courts consider in defining the relevant market.
80
The court's approach is representative of what parties can reasonably expect in merger litigation. While some judges understand and evaluate econometric evidence (and Judge Bates did far better than most), the natural tendency for a judge is to consider the market facts, including the documents and testimony, and give far more weight to those than to the econometric work, which often is reduced to a battle of opposing experts, models and assumptions. Judge Bates made no secret of his preferences in his opinion. He commented that cases relied on by the parties "have considered the Brown Shoe factors and ordinary course of business documents, in addition to econometric evidence, before reaching conclusions about the proper market definition."
81 Judge Bates did the same. The "wide array of qualitative evidence" introduced by the government "points to the existence of a Medicare-Advantage-only market." 82 None of the evidence at trial, he wrote, suggested "frequent, close competition between Medicare Advantage plans and particular Original Medicare" and MedSupp combinations. 83 Given what he had seen and heard from the witnesses and documents, he was not inclined to take the word of an economist that the market should be broadened beyond Medicare Advantage products, when the facts he had heard at trial were sufficient to persuade him of the narrower market.
84
Shortly after the decision was issued, Aetna and Humana abandoned the merger. 85 Aetna's chief executive was quoted saying it was "too challenging to continue pursuing the transaction" and "both companies need to move forward with their respective strategies." 86 The decision means an appellate court will not review the district court's decision. But the lower court's fact-intensive analysis left little room for an appellate court to reverse on the critical market definition issue, even if it was more sympathetic to the defendants' view of the econometric evidence.
REASONABLE INTERCHANGEABILITY AND THE ENDURING LEGACY OF BROWN SHOE
The DOJ's choice of a product market in Aetna-Humana set up a fight about reasonable interchangeability. The fight took center stage and was the focal point of the ruling that killed the $37 billion deal. The parties understandably hedged their bets and addressed the product market question both using traditional practical indicia evidence and economic analysis. There was nothing extraordinary about the traditional analysis, but it shines a light on some of the ongoing challenges in determining the proper product market when products are differentiated. In nearly all markets, each product has some attribute that distinguishes it from other products and makes it more or less attractive to consumers. These differences can include surface-level image/branding, quality/durability, and many other features. Most products have a unique set of characteristics so that there is no perfect substitute. Frequently, two products that differ only in some minimal way are both functionally and reasonably interchangeable. But some apparently superficial differences are not trivial À color can be a meaningful difference if consumers attach significance to different colors (e.g., pink and blue in infants' clothing or team or school colors on sporting paraphernalia). Even when two products have the same functional end use and very similar attributes, specific kinds of product differentiation can put the products in different markets.
Antitrust enforcers and courts have recognized that functionally interchangeable products are often in distinct markets. 87 There has also been general recognition that there can be cognizable submarkets within broader markets.
88
The challenge is using Brown Shoe À a multifactor analysis without any clear directive on which factors to give more or less weight À to determine when interchangeability is reasonable. The Aetna-Humana decision did not move the ball: it was emblematic of the kind of traditional Brown Shoe factor-analysis parties can expect from courts in merger cases today. The court seemed most influenced by the switching data and the parties' own documents, which treated Medicare Advantage and Original Medicare/MedSupp separately. The decision confirms the continuing importance of the Brown Shoe but also exposes the infamous case to more of the same criticism it has endured for decades. Brown Shoe has been subjected to a steady stream of abuse. Judge Bork famously wrote that "[i]t would be overhasty to say that the Brown Shoe opinion is the worst antitrust essay ever written. … Still, all things considered, Brown Shoe has considerable claim to the title."
89 Another federal judge referred to it as a "1960s-era relic" characterized by a "free-wheeling antitrust analysis [that] has not stood the test of time."
90 Yet most judges and practitioners are more comfortable navigating the Brown Shoe factors than assessing complicated expert testimony and other econometric evidence.
The Brown Shoe practical indicia do not usually offer a straightforward roadmap for assessing the proper product market. There are many ways to assess substitutability of products using the Brown Shoe factors and little direction from courts on which factors are the most important and under what circumstances. The court in Aetna-Humana did not dig in much to the demographics of consumers to assess whether there was actually consumer choice occurring between Original Medicare and Medicare Advantage. The court acknowledged that "there is evidence suggesting that Medicare Advantage plans tend to attract seniors with lower incomes."
91 But readers are left wondering how demographic data might be used in future to determine if products exist in the same or separate markets.
The case also shows, once again, the harm that bad documents can do to defendants in a merger case. 92 The court concluded that Original Medicare was not reasonably interchangeable with Medicare Advantage in part because the parties themselves treated these products very differently in their own documents and business operations. In this respect, the worst of the documents may have been the one in which an Aetna executive referred to Medicare Advantage and MedSupp as "apples and oranges."
93 This document and a handful of others appeared to sway the court's Brown Shoe analysis. In antitrust, substance usually prevails over form, 94 and some of the distinctions between Medicare Advantage and Original Medicare À such as the defendants' separate business units for each and some isolated comments that highlight the differences between the two À appeared to be more form than substance. Many companies have different business units for products that are plainly in the same market. In this respect, the decision is a reminder that optics matter even if substance ultimately should prevail over form.
The court did not neglect the econometric evidence entirely in favor of the traditional analysis, but the econometrics come off as secondary. Notably, the court cautioned against reliance on purely econometric evidence: "Econometric evidence can be powerful evidence, but it is not the only evidence that courts consider in defining the relevant market." 95 The court lent support to what many practitioners believe: econometric analysis is necessary, because to do without it leaves the economic field open to one's opponent, but if it is inconsistent with the weight of the evidence in the documents and testimony, it is unlikely to carry the day. The decision suggests that defendants must win on both ball fields for a contested merger to survive: they have to present a compelling traditional analysis and a strong counter to any econometric evidence offered by the government.
The court's product market analysis was sensible given the state of the law and the facts introduced at trial. Different people see the products differently À there is a durable preference among a sizeable segment of the population for Medicare Advantage products. Permitting the merger would have lessened competition between two of the industry's giants and harmed consumers in the process.
CONCLUSION
The DOJ's successful case enjoining the Aetna-Humana merger demonstrates what parties can expect from a court reviewing a merger where the reasonable interchangeability of products is at issue. The court's analysis is detailed and disciplined: it hits all the points one would expect in a thorough, well-reasoned ruling, tackling traditional Brown Shoe practical indicia and econometrics, both in detail. The opinion reminds us of the importance of the facts to a proper definition of a relevant product market when assessing a potential transaction, and also that econometric tools, while necessary (and expensive), still have not reached the point where they can turn the tide of battle in the face of facts that march in the opposite direction.
With the benefit of hindsight, the result seems predictable. The companies were aggressive and may have overestimated their odds of success. 'l Bank (1963, p. 363 88-90. 43 . The court ultimately decided that the proposed Molina divestiture did not adequately "counteract the competitive effects of the merger" (Opinion at 113, . Despite finding that the Molina divestiture was likely enough to occur, id. at 113, the Court found that the evidence did not indicate Molina would be a "successful competitor in the Medicare Advantage market" (Id.). The court was troubled by Molina's poor track record in the Medicare Advantage business, id. at pp. 111À112, and seemed convinced that some of the significant barriers to entry (e.g., building provider networks) would make Molina struggle to manage the 290,000 Medicare Advantage lives that would be subject to the proposed divestiture. Perhaps the fact that Molina was the best suitor the merging parties could come up with was an indication of how concentrated the Medicare Advantage market already is. 
